International Law Studies - Volume 84
International Law and Military Operations
Michael D. Carsten (Editor)

XIV
"Change Direction" 2006:
Israeli Operations in Lebanon and the
International Law of Self-Defense

Michael N. Schmitt'

O

n July 12,2006, Hezbollah launched Operation True Promise, the ambush
of Israel Defence Force (IDF) soldiers patrolling the border with Lebanon. l
Three Israelis were killed and two captured. Four morc died in an IDF tank responding to the attack, while an eighth perished as Israeli forces attempted to recover the bodies of the tank crew. Meanwhile, Hezbollah rocket attacks against
northern Israeli towns and IDF facilities killed two civilians.
Israel reacted qu.ick1y and forcefully with Operation Change Direction. The military action included a naval and air blockade of Lebanon, air strikes throughout
the country and, eventually, a major ground incursion into southern Lebanon. As
the IDF acted, Israel's Ambassador to the United Nations transmitted identical letters to the Secretary-General and the Security Council setting forth the legal basis
for the operation.
Israel thus reselVes the right to act in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations and exercise its right of self-defense when an armed attack is launched
against a Member of the United Nations. The State of Israel will take appropriate
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actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers and bring an end to the shelling
that terrorizes our citizens. 2

This article explores and assesses the Israeli justification for Operation Change
Direction. Did the law of self-defense provide a basis for the opemtion? If so, defense against whom-Hezbollah, the State of Lebanon or both? Were the Israeli
actions consistent with the criteria for a lawfuJ defensive action-necessity, proportionality and im mediacy? Did Operation Change Direction unlawfully b reach
Lebanese territorial integrity?
In order to frame the discussion , it is necessary to distinguish two distinct components of the international law governing the use of force . The jus ad bellum sets
normative boundaries as to when a State may resort to force as an instrument of its
national policy.3 Its prescriptive architecture is modest, at least in terms of lex

scripta.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use offorce in in ternational relations. 4 Only two exceptions to the proscription enjoy universal acceptance. The firs t is enforcement action sanctioned by the Security Council pursuant
to Chapter VII of the Charter. By this linear scheme, the Security Council may declare that a particuJar action or situation represen ts a " threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression."5 Once the declamtive condition precedent has
been met, it may im plement non-forceful rem edial measures. 6 Should such measures prove " inadequate," or if the Security Council believes they would not suffice, "it may take such action by air, sea, o r land forces as may be necessary to
maintain o r restore international peace and security."7 The Security Council does so
by authorizing and employing UN-commanded and -controlled forces or by giving a
mandate for enforcement action to either a regional organization o r individual
member States organized as an "ad hoc" coalition (or a combination of the two).
Although the Security Council did employ its Chapter VII authority to en hance
the size and mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as
part of the August 2006 ceasefire,1I it did not mandate Operation Change Direction,
either in JuJy 2006 or at an y p revious time. Instead, the legal basis fo r Operation
Change Direction submitted by Israel lay in the second express exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition-self-defense.
Article 51 codifies the right of States to use force defensively: "Nothing in the presen t Charter shall im pair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."9 A State acting in self-defense must imm ediately so notify the Security
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Council, a requirement epitomized during Operation Change Direction by Israeli
notification on the very day defensive military operations began. IO
The jus in bello, by contrast, governs how force may be employed on the battlefield. It addresses such matters as the persons and objects that may lawfully be targeted, how targeting has to be accomplished, and the protections to which
civilians, civilian objects and those who are I10rs de combat are entitled. II All sides to
an armed conflict m ust comply with the jus in bello; status as an aggressor or a victim in the jus ad bellum context has no bearing on the requirement. 12 This article
does not address the jus in bello. J3

The Prelude
A basic grasp of the complex historical predicates to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon is
essential to understanding Operation Change Direction and its normative context.
Southern Lebanon is a predominately Shiite area that has been largely ignored by
the Lebanese government. The absence of a strong governmental presence rendered the area susceptible to exploitation by anti-Israeli groups.
Until its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) used southern Lebanon asa base of operations against Israel. I 4 In 1978,
a PLO attack on two Israeli busses left thirty-seven dead and scores wounded. The
lDF reacted with Operation Litani, an operation designed to force the PLO and
other Palestinian armed groups from Lebanese territol)' south of the Litani River.
In response, the Security Council, in Resolutions 425 and 426, called on Israel to
withdraw from Lebanon. It also created UNIFIL to monitor the withdrawal, help
restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanon in establishing effective authority in the area. IS
UNIFIL and the Lebanese government proved impotent in deterring further
Palestinian attacks. 16 1n 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization's attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom precipitated Operation
Peace for Galilee. 17 During the controversial invasion of Lebanon, the IDF ousted
Syrian forces from Beirut and expelled the PLO, including its leader Vasser
Arafat. ls Israel established a buffer zone in the southern part of the country, where
the IDF remained for the next eighteen years.
The 1982 invasion radicalized many of southern Lebanon's Shiites. Inspired in
part by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, they created Hezbollah (Party of God).
Trained, armed, fman ced and logistically supported by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah's
manifesto includes the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon.19
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Since its formation, Hezbollah has repeatedly engaged in international terrorism. The catalogue of such acts is long and bloody. It includes the seizure of eighteen US hostages in the 1980s and '90s, the 1983 bombings of the US Embassy and
Marine Barracks in Beirut, a 1984 attack in Spain which killed eighteen US selVice
members, the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 (during which a US Navy sailor
was murdered), the 1994 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, and regular attacks against targets in Israel with bombs, rockets and surfuce-to-air missiles. 20
Israel twice launched major military operations-Operations Accountability
(1993) and Grapes of Wrath (I996)-in response.2 1
In May 2000, Israel ended its occupation of southern Lebanon, a move the Security Council recognized as compliant with Resolution 425. 22 Syria and Lebanon
protested, maintaining that the ongoing Israeli presence at Shab'a Farms, seized in
1967, violated the Resolution and amounted to continued occupation of Lebanese
territory.23 In any event, Hezbollah quickly filled the security vacuum created in
the wake of the withdrawal and contin ued to mount attacks against Israeli targets.24
A declaration by Hezbollah'sleader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, that "if]ews gather in
Israel, it will save us the trouble of going after them worldwide" confirmed the organization's aims.2s
During this period, Israel repeatedly called on Lebanon to establish control over
the south. Likewise, the Security Council regularly stressed the importance of Lebanese action. 26 The demands fell on deaf ears, in part due to the presence of Syrian
forces in the country.21 Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, a Maronite Christian
who assumed power in 1998, had seemingly decided to tolerate Hezbollah's presence and activities. In 2004, the National Assembly, acting under Syrian pressure,
amended the Constitution to allow extension ofLahoud's term in office for an additional three years. 28 The Security Council reacted in September with Resolution
1559.29 Jointly sponsored by the United States and France, the resolution called for
a Syrian withdrawal and the disarming of Hezbollah, a requirement previously set
forth in the 1989 Ta'if Accords ending Lebanese civil war.30
The assassination of Rafiq al- Hariri in February 2005 caused the situation to
deteriorate dramatically. Al-Hariri, a Suom, had SClVed as Prime Minister twice,
having only resigned the previous October. His assassination, which many believed
occurred at the behest of Syria, sparked massive demonstrations. The ensuing political crisis, labeled the "Cedar Revolution," led to the withdrawal of Syrian military forces. At the same time, the United Nations called on the Lebanese
government "to double its efforts to ensure an immediate halt to serious violations" of the Blue Line, the "border" (line to which the Israelis withdrew in 2000)
between Lebanon and Israel.}l

268

Michael N. Schm itt
In May, an anti-Syrian coalition won elections, but fell short of the National Assembly seats necessary to unseat Lahoud)2 Hezbollah, together with the Amal
Movement and other partners, took over a quarter of the parliamentary seats; two
of its members were appointed to cabinet posts in Prime Minister Faud Siniora' s
government. 33 But the postelection political arrangements proved fragile. In December 2005, the Hezbollah-Amal coalition walked out of the government when
the National Assembly agreed to a joint Lebanese-international tribunal to try
those accused in al-Hariri's death.:l4 Siniora was forced to make concessions to secure Hezbollah's return. In particular, he agreed never to refer to the organization
as a "militia" and adopted an official position that "the government considers the
resistance a natural and honest expression ofthe Lebanese people's national rights
to liberate their land and defend their honour against Israeli aggression and
threats."3S By characterizing Hezbollah as a resistance group, Siniora effectively
conceded the "legal fiction" that the Resolution 1559 requirement for militia disarmament did not apply to the organization.
Despite this victory, Hezbollah had been weakened by the "Cedar Revolution,"
departure of the Syrians, and Lebanese political in-fighting. It needed to somehow
recapture momentum. Terrorist operations against Israel seemed to present a
promising prospect fo r doing so. In November 2005, Hezbollah fired mortars and
rockets across the Blue Line against IOF positions and fac ilities. Its forces also assaulted government offices and IDF positions in Ghajar, purportedly in an attempt
to kidnap Israeli soldiers. Other actions against Israel followed.
Hezbollah moved quickly to strengthen its forces and stockpile arms. By midsummer of2006, the organization fielded two to three thousand fighters and thousands of rockets, some of which could reach far into Israel. Moreover, Nasrallah
had proclaimed that he intended to kidnap Israeli soldiers and use them as bargaining chips in a prisoner exchange; 2006 was to be "the year of retrieving prisoners. "l<>
The threat was highly credible, for in October 2000, Hezbollah fighters had crossed
into Israel and kidnapped three soldiers. Hezbollah killed them, using their bodies
as bargaining chips in a 2004 prisoner exchangeY
Sensitive to the ominous situation, Kofi Annan and other UN representatives
repeatedly called on the Lebanese government to move south and exert control over
the border areas. 38 Their concerns proved well founded. When Hezbollah mounted
Operation True Promise on July 12, Israel responded with Operation Change Direction. The subsequent exchanges proved heavy. Hezbollah launched 125 rockets on
July 13, 103 on the following day, and 100 on the fifteenth .39 On July 14, a Hezbollah
rocket struck an Israeli warship, killing two sailors. The incident was especially
noteworthy, for the attack could likely not have been mounted but for radar data
provided to Hezbollah from a Lebanese military radar site.4o
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For its part, Israel offered a seventy-two-hour ultimatwn for release of the captives and cessation of the rocket attacks.41 In the meantime, it declared an air and
naval blockade of Lebanon, conducted air strikes, and engaged in limited crossborder operations designed to foil rocket launches. Many of the initial targets, such
as Rafic Hariri In ternational Airport in Beirut and bridges throughout the country,
were lines of communication. 42 Israel hoped to prevent the removal of its kidnapped soldiers by cutting them. By late July, the lDF was moving into southern
Lebanon; on August 9, it launched ground operations extending well beyond the
border. 43 Two days later, the Security Council passed Resolution 1701, in which it
called for "the immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate
cessation by Israel of all offensive military operations."44 A ceasefire agreement
soon followed and hostilities ended on August 14. Israeli troops had completely
withdrawn from Lebanon by October.

The Israeli Legal Justification
As noted, Israel, in announcing its readiness to take "appropriate" steps to secure
the release of its soldiers and force a halt to the rocket attacks, justified its military
actions on the basis of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Somewhat precipitously, it pointed the finger of blame at not only at Hezbollah, but also
Syria, Iran and Lebano n.
Responsibility for this belligerent act of war lies with the Government of Lebanon,
from whose territory these acts have been launched into Israel. Responsibility also lies
with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic,
which support and embrace those who carried out this attack.
These acts pose a grave threat not just to Israel's northern border, but also to the region
and the entire world. The ineptitude and inaction of the Government of Lebanon has
led to a situation in which it has not exercised jurisdiction over its own te rritory fo r
many years. The Security Council has addressed this situation time and time again in
its debates and resolutions. Let me remind you also that Israel has repeatedly warned
the international community about this dangerous and potentially volatile situation.
In this vacuum festers the Axis of Terror: Hezbollah and the terrorist States ofIran and
Syria, which have today opened another chapter in their war of te rror.
Today's act is a clear declaration of war, and is in blatant violation of the Blue Line,
Security Council Resolutions 425 ( 1978), 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and all other
relevant resolutions of the United Nations since Israel withdrew from southern
Lebanon in May 2000. 45
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In great part, the Israelis attributed Hezbollah 's actions to Lebanon on the basis
of its fa ilure to control the sou th. A special Cabinet communique issued the da y of
the Hezbollah attacks noted that " Israel views the sovereign Lebanese Government
as responsible for the action that originated on its soil and for the return of the abducted soldiers to Israel. Israel demands that the Lebanese Government implement
UN Securi ty Council Resolution 1559."46 Prime Minister Olmert added a second
ground-Hezbollah's participation in the Lebanese government:
This morning's events were not a terrorist attack, but the action of a sovereign state that
attacked IsraeJ . . . . The Lebanese government, of which Hizbullah is a member, is
trying to undermine regional stability. Lebanon is responsible and Lebanon will bear
the consequences of its actionsF
The extent to which Israel initially focused responsibility on Lebanon was perhaps
best illustrated b y lDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Dan Halutz's threat to
"'turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years. "48
A November 2006 UN Human Rights Council report also drew a close connection between Hezbollah and Lebanon. In an analysis of the separate issue of
whether an "armed conflict" between Israel and Lebanon existed,49 the report
noted that
in Lebanon, Hezbollah is a legally recognized political party, whose members are both
nationals and a constituent part of its population. It has duly eJected representatives in
the Parliament and is part of the Government. Therefore, it integrates and participates
in the constitutional organs of the State.
[Flor the public in Lebanon, resistance means IsraeJi occupation of Lebanese territory.
The effective behavior of Hezbollah in South Lebanon suggests an inferred link
between the Government of Lebanon and Hezbollah in the latter's assumed role over
the years as a resistance movement against Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory
.... Seen from inside Lebanon and in the absence of the regular Lebanese Armed
Forces in South Lebanon, Hezbollah constituted and is an expression of the resistance
Cmukawamah' ) for the defence of the territory partly occupied .... Hezbollah had also
assumed de facto State authority and control in South Lebanon in non-full
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1159 (2204) and 1680 (2006) ....50
A Lebanese Cabinet policy statement of May 2005 had similarly characterized Hezbollah as a resistance force. Enhancing the purported relationship was Nasrallah's
leadership not only of Hezbollah's military wing, but also of the political wing that
was participating in government; neither faction advocated a peaceful solution to
the dispute with Israel.
271

Israeli Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the Law of Self-Defense
As Israel saber-rattled, Lebanon quickly denied culpability. In July 13 letters to
the UN Secretary-General and Security Council President, Lebanon claimed that
" the Lebanese Government was not aware of the events that occurred and are occurring on the international Lebanese border" and that "the Lebanese Government is not responsible for these events and does not endorse them."Sl Two days
later, in an "Address to the People," Prime Minister Siniora again distanced himself from the attacks, denying any prior knowledge thereofY Secretary-General
Kofi Annan accepted the Lebanese disclaimer. 53
Israel quickly backed away fro m assertions that the July 12 attacks were attributable to Lebanon, at least in the normative context of self-defense. O n the sixteenth, the Cabinet issued a communique that declared, "Israel is not fighting
Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who
have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian and Iranian enclaves of murder."$-! Similarly, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing paper prepared shortly before the conflict ended stated that although Lebanon bore responsib ility "for the
present situation , and consequently ... could not expect to escape the consequences, . . . Israel views Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran as primary elements in
the JihadlTerror Axis threatening not only Israel but the entire Western world."55 As
to Lebanon's responsibility, the paper deviated from the attitude adopted at the outset of hostilities:
Israel did no t attack the government of Lebanon, but rather Hizbullah military assets
within Lebanon. Israel avoided striking at Lebanese military installations, unless these
were used to assist the Hizbullah, as were a numbe r of radar facilities which Israel
destroyed after they helped the terro rists fire a shore-to-ship missile at an Israeli ship. 56

In fact, Israel assiduously avoided striking Lebanese government facilities and
equipment, at least absent an express link to Hezbollah. While the Human Rights
Council report referenced earlier cites a number of instances in which the lDF
struck Lebanese military targets, the discussion is marked by the paucity of examples-a military airfield, radar installations (recall that Lebanese radar facilitated
the anti-ship missile attack ofJuly 14) and a barracks. 51 Given the wherewithal of
the Israeli Air Force, the catalogue would undoubtedly have been far lengthier had
Israel wished it to engage Lebanon militarily.
Thus, by war's end, Israel was steering clear of arguments that Hezbollah actions
amounted to a Lebanese "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51. Whether
correct as a matter of law, tempering comments on the linkage represented sage
policy. First, Israel needed the Lebanese Army to move south to fill the security
void its withdrawal would leave if it hoped to avoid another long occupation of
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southern Lebanon. Second, little was to be gained in styling Operation Change
Direction as a response to a Lebanese "armed attack" because Israeli militaryoperations could more convincingly be legally justified as a direct response to
Hezbollah. Third, conflict between States in the volatile Middle East is always potentiallycontagious; therefore, for practical reasons, it is usually best to avoid portrayal of hostilities as inter-State. Finally, as will also be discussed, the international
com munity gingerly accepted Israel's need to defend itself against the increasingly
frequen t Hezbollah attacks. Limiting the finger-pointing to Hezbollah would fit
better within the prevailing international frame of reference, an important consideration in light of the fact that the international community's assistance would
likely prove helpful in securing the border areas. It would also avoid a direct conflict with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who early on adopted the position
that the Lebanese government had no advance notice of the July 12 attacks and
that the Hezbollah actions ran counter to the interests of the Lebanese government and people.58
Widespread, albeit cautious, acceptance of the legitimacy of the Israeli defensive
response to Hezbollah emerged. It was certainly apparent in the Security Council
discussions of July 14. S9 Similarly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan acknowledged
"Israel's right to defend itself under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter."60 So
too did individual States and their leaders.61 In the Arab world, Saudi Arabia criticized Hezbollah's "uncalculated adventures," a reproach echoed by Jordan, Egypt
and the United Arab Emirates.62 Indeed, Nasrallah complained that such censure
made possible the harsh Israeli reaction.6) Arab support only dissipated in the aftermath of Israel's July 30 bombing of Qana, during which twenty-eight civilians
died. 64 The Group of Eight, which was coincidentally meeting in July, condemned
Hezbollah actions and called on Lebanon to assert its "sovereign authority" over
the south, while the European Union made dear that it considered the right to selfdefense applicable. 65 In the United States, both the Senate and House of Rep res entatives passed resolutions condemning the attacks against Israel. 66 Finally, the SecurityCouncil dearly indicated in Resolution 1701 that Hezbollah's attacks of July
12 had precipitated events.67
Such acceptance is an important indicator of the operational code, the unofficial but actual normative system governing international actions. 68 In other words,
when seeking to identify the applicable law, it is essential to ascertain how the relevant international actors, especially States, interpret and apply the lex scripta. Only
then can norms be understood with sufficie nt granularity to assess an action's legality. It is to those norms that this analysis turns.
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Legal Analysis

Self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter was the claimed legal basis for Operation Change Direction. In addition to Hezbollah, Israel initially pointed the finger of blame at Lebanon. This begs the question of whether the attacks and
kidnappings of July 12 can be attributed to Lebanon such that Israel was justified in
characterizing them as an attack by Lebanon itself.
In that Israel's self-defense justification eventually centered on Hezbollah, and
given the international community's seeming acceptance of that position, the issue
of an "armed attack" attributable to Lebanon is not deter minative. Nevertheless, a
colorable argument can be fashioned to the effect that Hezbollah's actions were
equally Lebanon's, at least as a matter oflaw. In particular, Hezbollah's participation in the Lebanese government and the government's apparent recognition of
the organization as a legitimate resistance group support such a depiction.
Article 8 of the International Law Commission's Articles of State Responsibility
provides that an action carried out "on the instructions of, or under the direction
or control of, the State" amounts to an "act ofState,"69 H ezbollah's inclusion in the
Lebanese government, considered in light of Nasrallah's control over both the organization's political and military wings, is relevant in this regard. Yet, there is no
evidence that the Hezbollah parliamentarians or cabinet members directed or were
otherwise involved in the attacks, or that the Lebanese government controlled the
organization, either directly or indirectly. Neither could Hezbollah be fairly characterized as "an organ which has been placed at the disposal of a State by another
State ... [that exercised] elements of the governmental authority in the absence or
default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority" pursuant to Article 9.'0 Although Hezbollah received significant support from Syria and iran, those States did not exercise
sufficient control over the organization to meet the Article 9 threshold.
Even when actions qualify as acts of State for responsibility purposes, Article 50
bars the use offorcefuJ countermeasures in response to a breach short of an "armed
attack" under Article 51 (absent a Security Council mandate) .'l In other words,
when assessing the Israeli response, the question is when a non -State armed
group's actions can be attributed to a State for self-defense purposes.
It has long been recognized that support for non-State anned groups can
amount to an armed attack by the State supporter,12 The International Court of
Justice (IC]) has addressed the subject on multiple occasions. In the 1986 Nicaragua judgment, it found that a non-State actor's actions could amount to an armed
attack if the group in question was "sent by or on behalf' of a State and the operation, in light of its "scale and effects," "would have been classified as an armed
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attack ... had it been carried out by regular armed forces."7l In support of its position, the Court cited Article 3(g) of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression (33 14 (XXIX», which was characterized as reflective of customary
international law.'4 The ICJ confirmed this "effective control" standard in its 2005
Congo and 2007 Genocide decisions. 75
The Nicaragua standard has proven controversial. In 1999, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia rejected it in
Tadic. At issue was the existence of an international armed conflict in BosniaHerzegovina by virtue of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's relationship with
Bosnian Serb forces. In finding such a conflict, the Chamber adopted a more relaxed standard than that articulated by the ICJ. For the Chamber, the key was
"overall control going beyond mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations."76 Both the effective control and overall control standards would exclude
providing sanctuary or othenvise acquiescing to the presence of terrorists from the
ambit of "armed attack." Since no evidence exists of a substantive Lebanese government link to the July 12 Hezbollah attacks, the relationship between Lebanon
and Hezbollah met neither the Nicaragua "effective " nor the Tadic "overall" control tests.
In 2005, Judge Kooijmans, in his separate opinion in the Congo case, noted that
the Court had failed to take "a position with regard to the question whether the
threshold set out in the Nicaragua Judgment is still in conformity with contemporary international law in spite of the fact that that threshold has been subject to increasingly severe criticism ever since it was established in 1986."77 He was
perceptive. The le J ignored the operational code evident in the international community's reaction to 200 1 coalition attacks against the Taliban (the de facto government of Afghanistan). Taliban support for al Qaeda fell far below the bar set in
either Nicaragua or Tadic. Nevertheless, most States approved of Operation Enduring Freedom, with many offering material support.78 No international organization or major State condemned the operations. On the contrary, a month after
launch of operations, the Security Council condemned the Taliban "for allowing
Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Usama Bin Laden,
Al-Qaida and others associated with them." Additionally, it expressed support for
"the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime."79
Had the operational code for attributing attacks by non-State actors to States
been relaxed? The precise parameters of any emergent standard remained unclear
because the community reaction to attacks on the Taliban may merely have reflected a sense of relief over ouster of international pariahs, rather than a relaxation

275

Israeli Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the Law of Self-Defense
of the norms governing the use of force against States tied to terrorism. But if the
bar had been lowered, the new standard could arguably apply to Lebanon . Like the
Taliban, the Lebanese government allowed Hezbollah sanctuary when it failed to
move south, as it had agreed to do in the 1989 Ta' if Accords, and as the United
Nations and Israel had demanded. And with organized armed forces under its control, Lebanon presumably had more capacity to deny sanctuary to Hezbollah than
did the Taliban vis-a-vis al Qaeda.
Ultimately, attributing the July 12 attacks to Lebanon is problematic. True, the
President had expressed support for Hezbollah, the Cabinet had recognized it as
performing legitimate resistance functions, Hezbollah exercised government functions in the south and the failure of Lebanese forces to take control of the area
could be characterized as providing sanctuary. On the other hand, the organization
was not an organ of government empowered by Lebanese law, there is no evidence
that the Hezbollah cabinet ministers participated in the decision to strike Israel and
kidnap its soldiers, the government did not direct or control the operations, many
Lebanese officials opposed Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government publicly, officially and quickly distanced itself from the attacks.
Israel correctly grasped that there was a much firmer normative foundation on
which to base Operation Change Direction-self-defense against Hezbollah itself.
Prior to the terrorist strikes of September II , it might have been plausible to suggest that Article 51 applied only to attacks by State actors. 80 Those conducted by
non -State actors lay, so the argument went, in the realm of domestic and international criminal law enforcement.11l
Article 51, however, contains no reference to whom the offending armed attack
must be mounted by before qualifying for a defensive reaction as a matter oflaw.
Similarly, Articles 39 and 42 (which together comprise the other exception to the
Article 2(4) prohibition o n the use of force) do not limit the source of a threat to
the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression to States. 82 Beyond pure textual analysis, the Security Council has never restricted enforcement actions to those directed
against States; for instance, it has created international tribunals to prosecute individuals charged with crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide.83
By contrast, Article 2(4) specifically pertains to the use of force by member
States in their "international relations" (i.e., relations with other States) . This suggests that the drafters were sensitive to the textual scope of the articles. From an interpretive standpoint, it would resultantly be incongruous to add a State "attacker"
criterion to the law of self-defense.
A construal of Article 51 which included non-State actor attacks had already
been advanced by some members of the academy prior to the attacks of September
11 . For instance, Professor Oscar Schachter argued a decade earlier that
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lilt is dear that terrorist attacks against State officials, police or military units are
attacks on a State whe rever they occur. Attacks on private persons and private pro perty
may also be regarded as attacks upon a state when they are intended to intimidate and
strike fea r in order to compel that state to act, or refrain from political action.84

Similarly, Professor Yoram Dinstein has long maintained the right of a State to engage in "extraterritorial law enforcement" against attacks by non-State actors.8S
Moreover, it must be remembered that the locus classicus of the international
law of self-d efense, the nineteenth-century Caroline inciden t, involved non-State
actors.1l6 During the 1837 Mackenzie Rebellion in Canada, rebel fo rces sought refuge in New York state, where they also recruited from among a sympathetic population. On December 20, British forces boarded the Caroline, a steamer used for
travel between the United States and rebel bases, while it was docked in Schlosser,
New York. Of the thirty-three crewmembers and others on board, only twelve survived the onslaught. The attackers set the Caroline ablaze and sent it adrift over
Niagara Falls.
An exchange of diplomatic notes ensued, with the British claim ing that selfdefense necessitated the action, particularly in light of the American failure to police
its own territory. In 1841 , the incident tooka strange turn when New York authorities arrested one of the alleged British attackers, a Me. Mcleod, who, while intoxicated, had boasted of participating in the incident. The British demanded
McLeod's release, arguing that he was acting on behalf of the Crown in legitimate
self-defense. The arrest res ulted in a further exchange of diplomatic notes between
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his British counterparts, in particular Lord
Ashburton. 87 The conten ts of those notes, discussed below, became immortalized
as the origin of the modern law of self-defense.88 Thus, self-defense traces its normative lineage to an attack by a non-State actor.
In any event, it appeared as if the international community's reaction to the 9/1 1
attacks had settled the issue. The vel)' day after the terrorists struck, when no one
was pointing the finger of blame at an y State, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1368, which acknowledged the inherent right of self-defense in the situation. 89
On September 28, the Council reaffirmed 1368 in Resolution 1373.90 NATO and
the Organization of American States activated the collective d efen se provisions of
their respective treaties (which are expressly based on Article 51 },91 and Australia
initiated planning to join the United States in military operations pursuan t to the
ANZUS Pact.92 Forty-six nations issued declarations of support, while twen tyseven granted overilight and landing rights. State practice seemed to be demonstrating comfort with an operational cod e extending Article 51 to armed attacks by
non-State actors.
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Further evidence of this understanding of the scope of self-defense appeared as
the US-led coalition responded on October 7 with strikes against al Qaeda (and
Taliban) targets. In its notification to the Security Council that it was acting pursuant to Article 5 1, the United States confirmed that it considered the article applicable to the terrorist groUp.93 Subsequent State practice proved supportive. Australia,
Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Turkey and the United Kingdom provided ground troops.94 Georgia, Oman,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan
allowed US military aircraft to transit their airspace and provided facilities to support operations. 95 China, Russia and Arab States such as Egypt expressed acceptance of Operation Enduring Freedom. 96 The European Union depicted the
military operations as "legitimate under the tenns of the United Nations Charter
and of Resolution 1368 of the United Nations Security Council."9"J And the Security Council adopted repeated resolutions reaffirming the right to self-defense in
the context of the conflict in Afghanistan .96 It is undeniable that post-9111 practice
demonstrated the applicability of Article 5 1 to attacks by non-State actors.
Or so it seemed. In 2004, the International Court oflustice appeared to ignore
this demonstrable history in its polemical advisory opinion Legal Consequence of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 99 Faced with
claims that self-defense justified construction of the Israeli security fence, the
Court found Article 51 irrelevant because Israel had not averred that the terrorist
attacks the wall was intended to thwart were imputable to a State. 100 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal rejected the majority position, correctly pointing
out the absence in Article 51 of any reference to a State as the originator of an
"armed attack," as well as the Security Council's self-evident characterization of
terrorist attacks as armed attacks in, iflter alia, Resolutions 1368 and 1373. 101
Despite this telling criticism, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the
Court again fa iled to address the issue head on, inquiring only into whether a State,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was responsible for the actions of a non-State
actor, the Allied Democratic Forces, such that Uganda could act in self-defense
against Congo.102 In his separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans cogently maintained
the position that a non-State actor could mount an armed attack.
If the activities of armed bands present on a State's territory cannot beattributed to that
State, the victim State is not the object of an armed attack by it. But if the attacks by the
irregulars would, because of their scale and effects, have had to be classified as an armed
attack had they been carried o ut by regular armed forces. there is nothing in the
language of Article 51 of the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising its
inherent right of self-defence.103
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Judge Simma criticized the Court on the same basis, chastising it for avoiding its responsibility for clarifying the law in a case directly on point.
Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state, or rather the
prevailing interpretation, of the international law on self-defence for a long time.
However, in the light of more recent developments not only in State practice but also
with regard to accompanying opinio juris, it ought urgently to be reconsidered. also by
the Court. As is well known, these developments were trigge red by the terrorist attacks
of September II, in the wake of which claims that Article 51 also covers defensive
measures against terrorist groups have been received far more favourably by the
international community than other extensive re-readings of the relevant Charter
provisions, particularly the " Bush doctrine" justifying the pre-emptive use of fo rce.
Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001 ) and 1373 (20Ot) cannot but be read as
affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks by non-State actors can qualify as
"armed attacks" within the meaning of Article 51.104

International reaction to Operation Change Direction demonstrated that the
Court was swimming against the tide of the extant operational code. Although it
might have been arguable that the supportive reaction to defensive strikes against
al Qaeda (as distinct from law enforcement endeavors) was an anomaly deriving
from the horror attendant to the 9/ 11 attacks, it would be incongruous to analogously dismiss the international community's seeming acceptance of Israel's right
to act defensively against Hezbollah. What the Court failed to acknowledge is that
international law is dynamic, that if it is to survive, it has to reflect the context in
which it is applied, as well as community expectations as to its prescriptive content.
While the negotiating records of the United Nations Charter contain no explanation of the term "armed attack," it would seem logical that hostile actions by
non-State actors must, like those conducted by States, reach a certain level before
qualifying as an "armed attack."I05 For instance, in Nicaragua, the International
Court oOustice excluded "mere frontier incidents" from the ambit of "armed attacks."I06 Although the exclusion proved controversial,lo7 plainly the mere fact
that an incident occurs along a border does not disqualify it as an armed attack. As
noted by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in 1952 in response to a Soviet request to include
"frontier incidents" in a proposed Definition of Aggression , "What exactly does
this mean? There are frontier incidents and frontier incidents. Some are trivial,
some may be extremely grave."I08 Although a frontier incident of sorts,
Hezbollah's actions on July 12 certainly rise to the level of armed attack. 109 They
were planned in advance, complex in the sense of including multiple components
(abduction and rocket attacks) and severe (kidnapping, death, destruction of
property).I IO
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Actions in self-defense against armed attacks, whether from a non-State group
such as Hezbollah or a State, are subject to the same core criteria, which trace their
roots to the Caroline case, discussed supra. In one of that incident's diplomatic exchanges, Secretary of State Webster argued that
[uJnder these circumstances, and under those immediately connected with the
transaction itself, it will be for Her Majesty's Government to show, upon what state of
facts, and what rules of national law, the destruction of the "Caroline" is to be defended.
It will be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be
for it to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada--even supposing the mx:essity
of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all-did
nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of selfdefence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept dearly within it. lll

The three universally accepted criteria of self-defense appear in the extract: 1) necessity (" necessity of self-defence" and "no choice of means"), 2) proportionality
("nothing unreasonable or excessive"), and 3) immediacy ("instant, overwhelming" and "leaving ... no moment for deliberation") . These requirements matured
into, and remain, the nonnative catechism of self-defense. ll2 The International
Court of Justice recognized the first two as customary international law in Nicaragua;1l3 a decade later it applied thcm to Artide 51 self-defense in the advisoryopinion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 1l4 The Court has recently
confirmed the criteria in Oil Platforms (2003)llS and Congo (2005) .116 Immediacy,
the third criterion, is irrelevant when assessing Operation Change Direction because the Hezbollah attacks predated the Israeli response and continued throughout the IDF operations.
Conceptually, necessity is a qualitative criterion, whereas proportionality is
quantitative. Reduced to basics, necessity requires the absence of adequate nonforceful options to deter or defeat the armed attack in question. This does not
mean that non -forceful measures would not contribute to defense of the State.
Rather, necessity requires that "but for" the use of force, they would not suffice.
Necessity analysis is always contextua1 , for the utility of non-forceful measures
is situation specific. In the case of Operation Change Direction, a key variable was
that Hezbollah-an entity historically resistant to diplomatic, economic and other
non -forceful actions and dedicated to the destruction of Israel-had carried out
the attacks and kidnappings. Additionally, precedent existed that was directly on
point as to the futility of non-forceful mcasures in circumstances resembling those
precipitating Operation Change Direction. Recall the 2000 kidnapping of IDF
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soldiers and the use of their bodies in a prisoner exchange. History seemed to be repeating itself.
The most likely alternative to Israeli action was, of course, immediate Lebanese
action to 1) control those lines of communication Hezbollah might use to whisk
the captives out of the country, 2) recover the soldiers and 3) extend military control over the south such that the area could no longer be used as a base of operations, especially for rocket attacks. However, the necessity criterion does not
require naivete. As noted supra, extension of Lebanese government authority into
the south had been a cornerstone ofthe Ta'if Accords ending the civil war in 1989.
Further, in Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), the Security Council had
emphasized the urgency of exerting government control throughout the country
by disarming and disbanding Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. 117 Yet, the Lebanese government had done nothing; on the contrary, it appeared that Hezbollah
was growing militarily stronger. By the summer of 2006, it had two to three
thousand regular fighters , with up to ten thousand reserves. lIS Hezbollah's arsenal
included not less than twelve thousand rockets. Most were short-range Katyushas,
but the organization also possessed Iranian-supplied Zelzal-2s, with a range of210
kilometers, sufficient to strike deep into Israel. 1l9 lt was evident that action by the
Lebanese government, particularly given its political disarray over the past year,
did not represent a viable alternative to Israeli use of force.
Another possible alternative was deferral to action by the international community, much as Israel had done in 1991 when Saddam Hussein launched Scud missile
attacks against Israeli population centers during the "First Gulf War. " However,
the situation in 2006 was dramatically different. No friendly forces were engaged
against Hezbollah, as the coalition had been with Iraqi forces, and UNIFIL was patently impotent. The two States enjoying influence over Hezbollah, Iran and Syria,
offered little promise; the leader of the first had called for the Israel's destruction, 120
while the latter was technically at war with Israel. J2l Finally, over the years the
United Nations had demonstrated a marked inability to resolve matters in the area,
Security Council politics generally precluded strong Chapter VII action, and previous UN entreaties to Lebanon and Hezbollah had failed to achieve meaningful results. In any event, the attacks were under way and nothing in Article 51 (or the
customary law of self-defense) required Israel to yield to any other entity in defending itself. On the contrary, Article 51 expressly allows a State to act defensively
in the face of an armed attack "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."122 The Security Council had
taken no such step, nor did it purport to have done so. Operation Change Direction clearly met the necessity criterion of self-defense.
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The other relevant self-defense criterion is proportionality. Proportionality
deals with the degree of force permissible in self-defense; it allows the application
of no more force than required, in the attendant circumstances, to deter an anticipated attack or defeat one that is under way. In other words, while necessity mandates a consideration of alternatives to the use offorce, proportionality requires its
calibration.
Proportionality is frequently misapplied in one of two ways. First, the degree of
force employed by the defender is sometimes assessed through comparison to that
used by the aggressor on the basis of a false premise that the former may not exceed
the latter. But proportionality requires no such symmetry between the attacker's
actions and defender's response. 123 Operation Change Direction is paradigmatic.
Although the lOF response exceeded the scope and scale of the Hezbollah
kidnappings and rocket attacks manyfold, the only way effectively to have prevented movement of the hostages was to either destroy or control lines of communication. Further, the best tactic for preventing Hezbollah rocket attacks, especially
from mobile launchers, was through control of the territory from which they were
being launched.
The second common misapplication of the proportionality principle confuses
the jus ad bellum criterion of proportionality, under consideration here, with the
jus in bello principle by the same name. The latter prohibits "an attack which may
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage antici pated . "12~ It considers the consequences of individual or related operations, not the scope of a response to an
armed attack. us Proportionality in the jus in bello context is fully divorced from
that resident in the jus ad bellum-the autonomy of the two bodies oflaw is international law holy gospel.
Most critics of Operation Change Direction in the jus ad bellum context focus
on the proportionality criterion. The Secretary-GeneraJ, for example, condemned
Israeli operations on the ground that they had "torn the country to shreds,"
thereby producing resu1ts that ran counter to the Israeli need for the Lebanese military to exert its authority over southern Lebanon. 126 Similarly, the European Union
warned Israel about acting in violation of the principle. 127
But recall that to breach the proportionality norm, the defender must do more
than reasonably required in the circumstances to deter a threatened attack or defeat an ongoing one. On July 13, Hezbollah fired 125 rockets into Israel. The next
day, 103 were launched, with 100 impacting Israeli territory on the fifteenth. The
lDF entered Lebanon in force on July 22-a day after 97 rockets had been fired .
Nevertheless, the n umber of rocket attacks actually grew following the Israeli
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movement north. In all, Hezbollah rockets killed forty-three civilians and twelve
soldiers, while wounding nearly fifteen hundred. 128 It is self-evident, therefore,
that, at least vis-a.-vis operations designed to stop rocket attacks, Israeli actions
were proportionate (indeed, arguably insufficient).
More problematic from a proportionality perspective were Israeli operations
targeting lines of communication. In particular, the lOF bombed Beirut International Airport, 109 Lebanese bridges and 137 roads, and established air and naval
blockades. l 29 According to the Israelis, these steps were designed to frustrate any
spiriting of the hostages out of the country and to keep Hezbollah from being
resupplied. no As a general matter of operational art,l3l attacking lines of communication also allows an attacker to isolate the battlefield, an especially useful strategy in Lebanon given the concentration of Hezbollah in the south.
That a nexus existed between the stated objectives and the targets selected is apparent. The Israelis had intelligence that indicated there might be an attempt to remove the hostages from Lebanon and Hezbollah arms had been smuggled into
Lebanon from abroad, especially Syria and Iran . Interestingly, though, the lines-ofcommunication strikes provoked little discussion as to whether the IDF had gone
too far in the jus ad bellum sense. Instead, debate focused on two jus in bello questions: I) did the targets qualify as military objectives;132 and 2) even if they did, was
the expected harm to civilians and civilian property excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage. m The international community also condemned the effect the approach had on humanitarian assistance for the Lebanese civilian
population and the movement of displaced persons.I:lot
It does not seem possible to portray objectively Operation Change Direction as
disproportionate from the jus ad bellum point of view. Characterizing an action as
disproportionate can be justified on two grounds. First, the action may be so excessive relative to defensive needs that the situation speaks for itself-res ipsa loquitur.
That was clearly not the case with Operation Change Direction, for Hezbollah continues to conduct anti-Israeli attacks. By definition, therefore, the operation cannot be styled as overly broad, at least absent an argument the Israeli actions were
inept.
Moreover, the Hezbollah actions of July 12 must be assessed contextually. The
organization had been attacking Israel for a period measured in decades; no indication existed that it would desist from doing so in the future .l3S As noted by Judge
Roslyn Higgins, the present President of the International Court of Justice, proportionality "cannot be in relation to any specific prior injury-it has to be in relation to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression."I36 Viewed in this
way, the only truly effective objective from the defensive perspective was, as noted
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by the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, " Hezbollah neutralization."I37 The
law of self-defense does not require half measures.
Second, an action is disproportionate when a reasonably available alternative
military course of action employing significantly lesser force would have successfully met the defensive aims. Allegations of disproportionality are impossible to
evaluate in the absence of an asserted viable alternative.
The Report of the Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry exemplifies
misapplication of the principle. Although not tasked with conducting a jus ad
bellum investigation, the group nevertheless opined that
while Hezbollah's illegal action under international law of 12 July 2006 provoked an
immediate violent reaction by Israel, it is dear that, albeit the legal justification for the
use of armed force (self-defen ce), Israel's military actions very quickly escalated from a
riposte to a border incident into a general attack against the entire Lebanese territory.
Israel's response was considered by the SecurityCouncil in its resolution 1701 (2006) as
"offensive military operation". These actions have the characteristics of an armed
aggression, as defined by General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX).138
In a footnote, the Report noted that self-defense " is subject to the conditions of necessity and proportionality," citing Nicaragua and Nuclear Weapons as support. l39
The discussion of the escalation fro m riposte to general attack implies that the
Commission believed a violation of the latter criterion had occurred. Yet, the report failed to explain how a riposte, or even a border action, would have sufficed to
meet Israel's pressing defensive needs. In particu1ar, the Commission did not consider escalation in the context ofHezbollah's ongoing rocket attacks. Without such
granularity, its appraisal was purely condusory; indeed, absent a mandate to render such an evaluation, it was irresponsible.
Curiously, a normatively more m ature review came from Israeli official corners.
According to the April 2007 interim report of the Winograd Commission, which
Prime Minister Qlm ert established (and which was approved by the Cabinet) following widespread criticism of the conduct of the war,
The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on
a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on careful] [sic] study of
the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these
characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains
having significant political-international weight was Limited; an Israeli military strike
would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not [sic]
other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and
prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were firedwhich would have a high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These
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difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to
strike was taken.
Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did nol consider
the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of' containment', or
combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation
level', or military preparations without immediage [sic] military action---so as to
maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects
weakness in strategic thinking, which derives [sic} the respo nse to the event from a
more comprehensive and encompassing picture. l40

Ultim ately, the Winograd Commission concluded that the Prime Minister displayed "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence."141
This criticism could be interpreted as retlecting elements of both necessity and
proportionality-necessity in the sense that diplomatic and political moves should
have been employed, and proportionality in that military action below the
"escalation level" might have sufficed. But it is necessary to distinguish between
legal violation and strategic faili ng. The law does not mandate selection of the
best option; it requires that the choice made be reaso nable in the circumstances
as r easo nably perceived by the actor at the time. Thus, although the Winograd
Inter im Report articulated sensible alternatives, the mere existence of such alternatives does not establish a breach of the proportionality criterion. On the contrary, recall that the 2000 incident involving the capture of Israeli soldiers had
ended tragically, the Hezbollah missile arsenal had grown since the Israeli withdrawal, the Lebanese Army had failed to deploy south, the Lebanese government
was fractured and in disarray, and Hezbollah enjoyed the ability to sit on the border
and dictate escalation. The situation had become so complex by the summer of
2006 that no particular course of action was self-evidently optimal.
Assuming, arguendo, the Israeli defensive actions were both necessary and proportional, and assuming for the sake of analysis that the Hezbollah attacks cannot
be classed as a Lebanese "armed attack," the question of whether Israel had the
right to cross into sovereign Lebanese territory to conduct counterterrorist operations remains. The conundrum is the existence of contlicting international law
rights-Israel's right of self-defense, discussed supra, and Lebanon's right of territorial integrity.142
Territorial integrity lies at the core of the State-centric international legal architecture, and, thus, the general inviolability of borders is well entrenched in international law. Indeed, the UN Charter's sine qua non principle, the prohibition on
the use of force found in Article 2(4), expressly bars cross-border uses offorce by
singling out territorial integrity.143 On the other hand, self-defense is no less a
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cornerstone of international law; it represents the sole use of force unambiguously
permitted without Security Council sanction.
Beyond possessing rights, States also shoulder obligations in international law.
Of particular relevance with regard to Operation Change Direction is the duty to
police one's own territory to preclude its use to the detriment of other States. As
John Basset Moore noted in the classic 1927 Pennanent Court of Justice case, I1le
S.S. Lotus, "'[IJt is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent
the commission within its dominions of criminal acts against another nation or its
people."144 The International Court of Justice reaffirmed this obligation in its very
first case, Corfu Channel. 14s In relevant part, the underlying incident involved two
British warships which struck mines in Albanian waters while transiting the Corfu
Strait. The Court concluded that since the mines could not have been laid without
its knowledge, Albania bore responsibility based on "certain general and well recognized principles," including "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of others. "146 The Court reiterated
the point in United States Diplomaticand Consular Staff in Tehran, which involved
seizure by Iranian radicals of the US embassy in Tehran and consulates in Tabriz
and Shiraz, as well as the taking hostage of American diplomats and other citizens.147 There, the Court held that Iran's failure to protect the diplomatic premises
and subsequent refusal to act to free the hostages violated its "obligations under
general in te rn ational law. "1~8
Soft-law instruments further support an obligation to police one's territory. For
instance, the International Law Commission's 1954 Draft Code of Offences against
the Peace and Security of Mankind labels "the toleration of the organization of . . .
[armedJ bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands
of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for incursions into
the territory of another State" an offense against "the peace and security of mankind . "1~9 Similarly, General Assembly 2625 ( 1970), Declaration on Principles of In-

temational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in
accordance wilh the Charter of the United Nations, provides that
[eJvery State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts,
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force. ISO

In terms of State practice, the most useful contemporary reference point is al
Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as a base of operations. In 1999, the Security Council
imposed sanctions on the Taliban government fo r, in part, granting sanctuary to
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Osama bin Laden and for permitting al Qaeda "to operate a network of terrorist
training camps from Taliban-controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base
from which to sponsor international terrorist operations."lsl It insisted that the
Taliban
cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their
organizations, take app ropriate effective measures to ensure that the territory under its
control is not used for terrorist installations and camps, or fo r the preparation or
organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with
efforts to bring indicted terrorists to justice.

Included was a specific demand that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden. 152
The following year, the Council levied additional sanctions after the Taliban failed
to expel al Qaeda; it established a sanctions-monitoring mechanism in 200 I. IS)
Of even greater normative weight was the absence of international condemnation when the United States attacked Afghanistan after the Taliban failed to heed
post-9fII warnings to turn over Bin Laden and rid the country of terrorists.lS4
While, as discussed, the legitimacy of translating the non-reaction into a new
norm regarding State support of terrorism is questionable, it is certainly evidence
of a community conviction that Afghanistan had not met its obligations to police
its territory.
Given the aforementioned hard law, soft law and State practice, any formula for
resolving a conflict between one State's right to self-defense and another's right of
territorial integrity must include the fact that the need for conducting the defensive
operations arises only when the latter fails to meet its polidngduties. But territorial
integrity must equally be factored into the formula . Therefore, before a State may
act defensively in another's territol)', it must first demand that the State from
which the attacks have been mounted act to put an end to any future misuse of its
territory. ISS If the sanctuary State either proves unable to act or chooses not to do
so, the State under attack may, following a reasonable period for compliance (measured by the threat posed to the defender), non-consensually cross into the
former's territol)' for the sole purpose of conducting defensive operations. The victim State may not conduct operations directly against sanctuary State forces and
must withdraw as soon as its defensive requirements have been met. l56 Since the
victim State has a legal right to act defensively, the sanctuary State may not interfere
with the defensive operations so long as they meet the aforementioned criteria. If it
does, it will have itself committed an armed attack against which the victim State
may use force in self-defense.
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This proposition is far from novel; rather, it is, reduced to basics, the Carolit/e
case. IS7 Recall that the United Kingdom demanded the United States put an end to
the use of its territory by rebel forces. It was only after US authorities failed to comply that British forces crossed the border in a form of self-help. Those forces withdrew immediately on capture and destruction of the CarD/it/e. As noted by Lord
Ashburton in his correspondence with Secretary of State Webster,
I might safely put it to any candid man, acquainted with the existing state of things, to
say whether the military commander in Canada had the remotest reason, on the 29th
day of December, to expect to be relieved from this state of suffering by the protective
intervention of any American authority. How long could a Government, having the
paramount duty of protecting its own people, be reasonably expected to wait for what
they had then no reason to expect? IS8
The facts underlying the British actions were even less compelling than those in the
instant case. Although New York authorities were sympathetic to the Canadian rebels, they were not in breach of international demands that control be established
over the territory in question. Further, the United States was actively enforcing the
laws of neutrality. IS9
In their separate opinions in the Cot/go case, Judges Kooijmans and Simma took
a stance similar to that presented here. As Simma perceptively noted,
Judge Kooijmans points to the fact that the almost complete absence of governmental
authority in the whole or part of the territory of certain States has unfortunately
become a phenomenon as familiar as international terrorism. I fully agree with his
conclusions that, if armed attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory
against a neighbouring State, these activities are still armed attacks even if they cannot
be attributed to the territorial State, and, further. that it "would be unreasonable to
deny the attacked State the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker
State and the Charter does not so require SO."I60
How could it be otherwise?161
The standards set forth apply neatly to Operation Change Direction. Following
its withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Israel repeatedly demanded that Lebanon
move south to secure the area from Hezbollah and other terrorist attacks. The international community did so as well. However, Lebanon took no steps to put an
end to the misuse of its territory; on the contrary, it seemed to embrace. albeit
somewhat guardedly, Hezbollah. Either it chose not to police the south or it cou1d
not, but whatever the case, it did not, thereby opening the door for Israeli defensive action.

288

Michael N. Schmitt
Moreover, Israel moved in a very measured, stepped fashion. Its initial operations were mostly limited to air attacks and the naval blockade. Ground force operations took place only in the border areas. It was not until September 9 that the lOF
launched large-scale ground operations into southern Lebanon, and even then
they were confined geographically to the area south of the Litani River. Operation
Change Direction was also confined temporally. The entire operation lasted a mere
thirty-four days, at which point a ceasefire was negotiated that provided for an Israeli withdrawal and, at least in theory, safeguarded Israel's security along its
northern border. Finally, although Israel did strike Lebanese military targets, it is at
least arguable that the faciliti es struck supported Hezbollah operations, as in the
case of the radar stations used in support of the strike on the Israeli warship.

Conclusion
Operation Change Direction remains a subject of continuing controversy, although most criticism centers on the jus in bello. With regard to the jus ad bellum,
there is relative agreement that Israel had the right to respond to the Hezbollah attacks pursuant to the law of self-defense. Its response comported with the various
requirements set forth in that body of law. Hezbollah's Operation T rue Promise
rose to the level of an "armed attack" as that term is understood normatively, and
the Israeli response met both the necessity and immediacy criteria. Although disagreement exists over compliance with the criterion of proportionality, when Operation Change Direction is considered in the context of not only the July 12 Hezbollah
attacks, but also those which had preceded them and those which likely would have
followed, the standard was met.
A colorable argument can be fashioned that Lebanon also bore legal responsibility for the attacks, perhaps even to the extent that it could be treated as having conducted them itself. This is especially so in light of the heightened scrutiny State
support of terrorism is subject to in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks
against the United States. However, such an argument, which can be questioned as
a matter oflaw, need not be made, for the lawof self-defense provided an adequate
foundation for the Israeli actions.
In terms of the continuing construction of the normative architecture governing the use of force, Operation Change Direction is relevant in two important regards. First, it serves as further evidence of an operational code extending the reach
of self-defense to armed attacks conducted by non-State actors. Despite the apparent unwillingness of the International Court of Justice to acknowledge that the law
of self-defense now reaches such actions, State practice demonstrates acceptance
by the international community. Second, Operation Change Direction serves as an
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excellent illustration of the growing acceptability of cross-border counterterrorist
operations when the State in which terrorists are located fails to comply with the
duty to police its own territory.
These issues loomed large on the international legal horizon following the attacks of September 11. Reaction to the coalition response, Operation Enduring
Freedom, suggested that the international community had come to interpret Article 51 as allowing an Article 51 response against non-State actors, including a nonconsensual penetration of another State's territory to carry it out. However, operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban made for weak precedent because both
groups were globally reviled. Operation Change Direction, therefore, serves as an
important milestone in crystallizing the operational code in such matters.
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reprinted ill id. at 422 [hereinafter Additi onal Protocol I].
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14. Which in turn contributed to the fifteen-year internal conflict (1975-9Q) between various Lebanese political and religious factions.
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.htm.
20. Cronin et al., supra note 19, at 34-35.
21. Sharp et al., supra note 18, at 35.
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25. Paul Adams, Fears MowHing of A1lother Israeli War witll Hezbollah, GLOBE AND MAll
(Canada), Dec. 13,2002, at A8.
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54. Israel Cabinet Secretariat, Cabinet Communiqu~ (July 16, 2006), availllble at http://
www.mfa.gov.iIIMFNGovernmentlCommuniques/2006/Cabinet+Communique+16-Jul·2006
.htm.
55. Behind the Headlines: Israel's Counter Terrorist Campaign, supra note 43.
56. Id. Speaking before the Secur-ityCouncil on July 31, the Israeli Ambassador noted th at Is·
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AI; Israel Acting in Self·defense, Says Howard, ABC NEWS ONLINE, July 16, 2006, http://
www.abc.net.aulnews/newsitemsf200607/s 1687707.htm; Jane Taber, Harper Defends Israel's
Right to Defend ItseIj,"THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), July 14, 2006, at A12.
62. AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON, HEZBOUAH: A SHORT HISTORY 136-37 (2007). citing
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available at http://documents-dds·ny.un.orgldoclUNDOCiGEN/NOI/567/85/pdf/NOI56785
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99. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in th e Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 20041.C]. 131 Oul y9).
100. [d., para. 139.
101. ld. at Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 33; $epMate Opinion of Judge
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